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1. Introduction 
The commercialization of innovation often depends on transferring the knowledge and 
technology underlying an innovation from the original inventor to a firm able to effectively develop that 
innovation for the market (Teece, 1986; Arora et al., 2001). The gains from technological trade may 
include reductions in the costs associated with translating an idea into a commercially viable product and 
enhancing specialization by firms into knowledge production or commercialization (Arora et al., 2001). 
Imperfections in the market for technology may significantly reduce the gains from technological trade. 
Potential licensors may limit information disclosure in order to avoid expropriation by potential partners 
(Arrow, 1962; Anton and Yao, 1994), particularly when knowledge disclosure requires effort on the part 
of the licensor (Arora, 1995). Moreover, matching in the market for technology may depend on a costly 
search process, limiting technology partnerships (Hellmann, 2005). 
This paper evaluates the role that formal intellectual property (IP) rights, most notably patents, 
play in facilitating technology transfer between firms in the market for ideas (Kitch, 1977; Nelson and 
Merges, 1990; Arora, 1995; Arora et al., 2001; Gans et al., 2002). We focus on how the IP system 
impacts the timing of cooperation between start-up technology entrepreneurs and established firms during 
commercialization. Building on studies of the operation of the patent system (Cohen and Merrill, 2003; 
Jaffe and Lerner, 2004), we empirically exploit a fundamental feature of the patent system: patent grant 
delay. While most analyses implicitly assume that once an invention is developed, IP rights are granted 
and enforced, both the grant of IP rights and the achievement of cooperation take place over time. When 
licensing occurs, it takes place in one of two institutional regimes: a pre-patent period in which the scope 
and timing of rights is uncertain, or a post-patent period in which uncertainty about the scope of IP rights 
has been narrowed. Start-up innovators pursuing a cooperative commercialization strategy face a crucial 
dynamic tradeoff: while an early agreement enhances productive efficiency (and reduces time-to-market), 
later agreements may be associated with greater bargaining power and more effective technology transfer. 
We contend that the timing of cooperation is, therefore, a key strategic choice, and the optimal timing of 
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cooperation depends on the commercialization environment in which the firm operates.1  
To explore how the business environment shapes commercialization dynamics, we focus on the 
moment at which the rights to be granted by the USPTO are announced to the patent applicant, the Notice 
of Patent Allowance event (“patent grant” follows several months later). The identification strategy 
exploits the significant empirical variation in patent allowance and licensing lags across technologies, and 
the timing of licensing relative to patent allowance. Using a novel dataset of technologies developed by 
start-up innovators and ultimately commercialized through cooperation, we link the timing of cooperative 
licensing with the timing of patent allowance. We examine whether the hazard rate for cooperation 
changes in response to a change in the commercialization environment (the mitigation of uncertainty 
resulting from patent allowance), and how the impact of patent allowance depends on firm, technology 
and industry characteristics. By studying how the timing of cooperation is influenced by the timing of 
patent allowance, we provide evidence of the causal influence of the IP system on the market for ideas. 
Our findings indicate that patent allowance substantially increases the hazard rate of achieving a 
licensing agreement (a 70-80% increase in the licensing hazard), and this effect is most pronounced in the 
time period immediately following the patent allowance event. The overall rate of licensing and the 
salience of patent allowance on the licensing hazard rate are associated with measures of the strategic and 
institutional environment in which firms operate. For technologies where productive efficiency effects are 
important, the overall rate of licensing is more rapid. For technologies with alternative IP rights available 
(such as copyright) or firms in locations where information brokers and reputational mechanisms may be 
important (such as Silicon Valley), the impact of patent allowance on the licensing hazard rate is reduced. 
We are cautious in our interpretation, however, as the sample size is modest and the analysis is 
conditioned on a sample of firms for which licenses are observed.  
2. Probabilistic Patents 
Recent research on the impact of the patent system on technology entrepreneurship emphasizes 
                                                 
1 Only a few studies consider licensing timing (Katila and Mang, 2003; Dechaneaux et al., 2003; Elfenbein, 2005), 
and these do not focus on the role of patent grant delay in start-up commercialization. 
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the potential role of intellectual property in facilitating commercialization through the market for ideas 
(e.g., Nelson and Merges, 1990; Anand and Khanna, 2000; Arora et al., 2001; Gans et al., 2002). In the 
absence of formal intellectual property, start-up innovators seeking commercialization partners may be 
subject to expropriation (Arrow, 1962; Anton and Yao, 1994). At the same time, efficient 
commercialization often requires contracting with more established partners in control of key 
complementary assets (Teece, 1986). Formal intellectual property rights may enable technology transfer 
by reducing the potential for expropriation, thereby increasing the incentives for knowledge disclosure 
and technology contracting. This perspective on the patent system assumes that the operation of the patent 
system is efficient and involves an unambiguous administrative process: patents are granted in a timely 
manner and are associated with well-defined property rights conferring significant competitive advantage. 
However, recent research on the operation of the patent system and patent enforcement has emphasized 
that patents are “probabilistic” property rights (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). To the extent that IP rights are 
probabilistic, uncertainty may have implications for technology contracting. As discussed in Section 3, 
specific types of uncertainty may limit opportunities for efficient contracting and shift the timing of 
cooperative commercialization. It is, therefore, useful to distill the distinct types of uncertainty over 
patent rights: patent allowance, patent scope, patent grant delay, patent enforceability, and patent value.  
Patent grant uncertainty. A crucial source of potential uncertainty in the patent system could be 
whether a patent applicant is likely to receive any patent rights. While the formal structure of the patent 
system suggests a high degree of uncertainty over patent grant, recent empirical research on the US and 
EU patent systems suggest that most patent applications are granted in some form. Accounting for 
“continuing patent applications” (which allow applicants to revise their applications over time), the US 
grant rate may be as high as 90 percent (Quillen and Webster, 2001; Graham and Harhoff, 2006). The key 
moment at which the uncertainty over grant is resolved is the Notice of Allowance. When inventors 
receive this Notice, the claims that will be granted are specified.2 While the Notice of Allowance 
                                                 
2 See www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/1300_1303.htm#sect1303: “The application identified 
above has been examined and is allowed for issuance as a patent. Prosecution on the merits is closed.” (underlined in 
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mitigates uncertainty over allowed claims, it reduces but does not eliminate more pervasive sources of 
uncertainty, such as the ultimate patent scope, or the costs and probability of enforcement. 
Patent scope uncertainty. While most patent applicants are granted a patent in some form, 
significant uncertainty exists over the scope of the patent rights ultimately allowed and the enforceability 
of allowed claims through litigation.3 The heart of the patent examination process involves repeat 
negotiations and correspondence between a patent applicant and the patent examiner over the allowance 
of particular patent claims, or the wording of those claims (Cohen and Merrill, 2003). This uncertainty of 
patent scope prior to allowance increases the costs of specifying a technology license (Lerner and Merges, 
1998). Moreover, pre-allowance contracts often require complex contingent clauses (one of our 
practitioner interviews said: “royalty rate r applies if Claim #x is allowed, while royalty rate r’ applies if 
Claim #x is disallowed”). As noted by Heller and Eisenberg (1998), “Although US patent law does not 
recognize enforceable rights in pending patent applications, firms and universities typically enter into 
license agreements before the issuance of patents, and firms raise capital on the basis of the inchoate 
rights preserved by patent filings…each potential patent creates a specter of rights that may be larger than 
the actual rights...conferred by the PTO.” Patent allowance not only reduces patent scope uncertainty, but 
also reduces information asymmetry between applicants and potential licensees (applicants have detailed 
information about interactions with the examiner and likely patent scope). Of course, uncertainty over 
patent scope is not fully resolved until “the last court speaks,” requiring significant (endogenous) 
investment and time (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). 
Patent pendency uncertainty. Though most research on the patent system implicitly assumes that 
patent application and grant are coincident (or are, at best, an administrative matter), patent application 
lags are long and variable. According to Popp et al. (2004), the average patent grant lag (inclusive of 
                                                                                                                                                             
the original and accessed 11/15/06). The Notice specifies issue and publication fees, deadlines, and the process of 
readying the patent for formal grant. We focus on the Notice of Allowance date (rather than the traditional patent 
grant date) since this is when uncertainty over allowed claims is resolved. We adopt the term “allowance” rather 
than “grant,” except where we discuss studies or phenomena focusing on the patent grant event per se.  
3 Examiners produce “office actions” (interim decisions regarding applications) providing information that “may be 
useful in aiding the applicant to judge the propriety of continuing the prosecution of his/her application…few 
applications are allowed as filed.” (http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#office).  
  6
provisional applications and patent continuance) is 28 months, with a standard deviation of 20 months. 
Variation in patent grant delay seems to be driven by idiosyncratic factors: even with detailed controls, 
only 10% of the overall variance in patent grant delay is explained by observable factors, and the most 
important factors seem to be broad differences across technological fields (Popp et al., 2004).4 Patent 
pendency (and idiosyncratic variance in the process) has important implications for the timing of 
technology licensing: while licensors may be able to reduce transactional costs and enhance the value of 
licenses realized after patent allowance, innovators face significant opportunity costs if they delay 
commercialization while applications are pending. 
Patent enforcement uncertainty. While the end of patent pendency mitigates certain uncertainties 
such as the variability of allowed claims, significant uncertainty remains concerning the ability to enforce 
those claims through the legal system. As emphasized by Lemley and Shapiro (2005), the uncertainty 
associated with litigation implies that patent grants are best characterized as probabilistic rights. It is 
useful, however, to distinguish how the nature of uncertainty changes after the allowance date. First, 
whereas the uncertainty arising during the pre-grant period involves significant information asymmetries 
between the applicant and potential licensees (since external parties may not have access to the complete 
record of “office actions” or even more informal interactions with patent examiners), the uncertainties 
associated with litigation are symmetric: both parties are on (roughly) equal footing in evaluating the 
allowed claims and their likelihood to survive court scrutiny. Second, whereas the uncertainty arising in 
the pre-grant period is systematic (no applicant can avoid the uncertainties associated with the patent 
application process), the resolution of uncertainty over validity claims and the enforcement of damages is 
endogenous to the litigation and negotiation strategies of patent holders and potential infringers. As 
Farrell and Shapiro (2007) argue, there are many cases where the incentives to litigate are low (or even 
negative), even in the absence of the transaction costs associated with litigation. Given that patent 
                                                 
4 A recent literature debates the relationship between patent grant lags and the importance of the innovation. While 
Johnson and Popp (2003) suggest that more important innovations (as proxied by forward citations) are associated 
with more important innovation, Harhoff and Wagner (2005) find the reverse correlation using EU patent data. See 
Popp et al. (2004)  
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litigation is expensive (compared to the relatively modest costs of patent application) it is not surprising 
that relatively few patents are litigated to a final judicial resolution: most patents never confront a full 
judicial review of their underlying validity or their legal scope (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). 
Uncertainty over market value. Finally, even if the legal uncertainty associated with patents was 
completely resolved, the economic and strategic value of patents is subject to a high degree of 
uncertainty. Patents vary widely in their value, which depends on endogenous outcomes in technology 
and product markets. For example, very few of the patented innovations in the biopharmaceutical 
industries are ultimately commercialized, and it is difficult to distinguish between different candidate 
drugs prior to the clinical trial process. The value of patent rights is thus probabilistic and can best be 
understood in terms of option value. While most patents confer limited returns to the innovator, a small 
fraction of patented innovations yields very high returns (Arora et al., 2003 and references therein). 
3. Patent Grant Delay and Frictions in the Markets for Ideas 
When the market for technology transfer functions well, efficient trades occur and, moreover, 
they occur in a timely manner (Arora et al., 2001). Put simply, the “sale” of an idea allows an innovation 
to be commercialized more quickly, yielding gains in productive efficiency, and so delays in the timing of 
cooperative agreements reflect a lost opportunity for maximizing the welfare gains from ideas trading. 
This section considers the potential drivers of delays in the licensing process and the dynamic interplay 
between patent grant timing and the timing of cooperative agreements. Our objective is not to develop a 
comprehensive model of the determinants of license timing; instead, our objective is to concisely 
illustrate (a) why the patent allowance date will not matter in the absence of market imperfections in the 
market for ideas, and (b) how the presence of market imperfections implies a dependence between the 
patent allowance date and the timing of technology licensing. In so doing, we seek to identify the impact 
of the operation of the patent system on the efficiency of the market for ideas. 
The frictionless benchmark. Before turning to the impact of specific market imperfections, we 
begin by considering a “frictionless” environment to establish a benchmark for efficient trade in the 
market for ideas. Consider a stylized representation of the innovation commercialization process depicted 
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in Figure A. There are three distinct phases. After an initial invention or prototype is developed, the 
technology entrepreneur files a patent application. Following a patent application there is a waiting stage 
during which there is uncertainty over patent scope and indeed whether it will be granted at all. Patent 
allowance (taken here as synonymous with the grant date)5 reduces this uncertainty but does not resolve it 
because infringement may still occur, and defending against it may be costly and uncertain.  
Consider the interactions between a single potential “customer” for an invention (C) to whom the 
research firm (R) might license (as in Aghion and Tirole, 1994). Both parties are risk neutral.6 The 
potential commercial value of the invention to C is v. For a frictionless market, we assume that: (1) there 
is symmetric information between C and R regarding v and any other aspect of the patenting process; (2) 
C and R know of each other’s existence from the outset (that is, R faces no search costs) and (3) but for 
the knowledge contained in the patent application, C has the necessary knowledge and resources to realize 
the value of the innovation. This last assumption implies that expropriation concerns are limited to 
knowledge which is potentially patentable, and that there is no specific human capital or tacit knowledge 
(in the sense of Arora, 1995) that must be drawn upon or otherwise disclosed for C to make full use of the 
invention. Below, we relax each of these assumptions to demonstrate the impact of frictions and market 
imperfections on the market for ideas. 
A lengthy patent process implies that it will take, say, T periods from the time of application until 
the time a patent is allowed.7 In addition, there is uncertainty as to the scope of the potential patent, which 
will impact a pre-patent agreement. With probability p, a patent is granted with broad scope (and with 
probability 1-p with narrow scope). For concreteness, we define a patent with broad scope as one which is 
very difficult to “invent around”, while a narrow patent is essentially unenforceable (either C or other 
firms will be able to invent around the formal intellectual property). Narrow patent scope not only reduces 
R’s returns on the innovation, but can also impact C’s returns as well (under narrow scope, the value of 
                                                 
5 The lag between allowance and grant varies and is subject to some uncertainty. While this could be incorporated 
with additional notation, it would not change the main result or our hypotheses. 
6 Introducing risk aversion will create incentives to share risk among firms, which reinforces the incentives for early 
cooperation. We do not pursue this extension here, as we do not address this issue in our empirical work. 
7 Patent grant delay is itself uncertain. Adding this additional uncertainty would only strengthen our results. 
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the innovation to C will be v v< ). Note that both v and v are expected returns conditional on broad 
versus narrow patent scope. This is due to the possibility of residual uncertainty from both commercial 
opportunities and the robustness of the patent claims in any subsequent litigation that might arise. Note 
that patent scope is distinct from patent validity, as patent grants do not establish validity (they instead 
grant the right to litigate). A patent is not valid until the “last court” speaks – and so patent awards reduce 
but do not eliminate patent scope and validity uncertainty (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005).8 
As the firms are risk neutral, we consider licensing agreements whereby R assigns any patent 
rights to C for a flat fee.9 License agreements may be negotiated at either time 0 or T. If an agreement is 
signed at time 0 (for a fee, 0t ), it is binding throughout the pre- and post-patent phases. If no agreement is 
signed, another opportunity to come to an agreement occurs at time T. Let [ ] (1 )E v pv p v≡ + − . By 
signing an agreement at time 0, C gets (1 ) [ ]T Tv E vδ δ− +  while R gets paid immediately. If no agreement 
is signed, then a license agreement is negotiated at T (for a fee, tT) following the reduction in patent scope 
uncertainty.10 If scope is narrow, C can realize the commercial value of the innovation without an 
agreement (tT = 0). We assume that the negotiators are able to achieve a cooperative outcome (i.e., firms 
“maximize” and split the surplus evenly).11 At T, if patent scope is wide, 12Tt v= , while if patent scope is 
narrow, 0Tt = . If we suppose that commercialization is not feasible until a licensing agreement is signed, 
if the firms wait, the expected licensing fee at time 0 is 12p v  with R’s expected return being 
1
2
T p vδ  and 
C’s being 12( (1 ) )
T p v p vδ + − . Based on these expected returns, there is always a joint gain for C and R 
to sign an agreement at time 0. The joint expected returns from an agreement at time T are [ ]T E vδ  while 
                                                 
8 We thank the editorial reviewers for bring up this point. See Farrell and Shapiro (2007) for further discussion. 
9 C might make payment to R contingent upon realized patent scope, a contingent fee. For the results that follow, 
allowing for contingent fees or royalty payments would make little difference, even in the market friction case.  
10 We assume that until T, only R and C can utilize the innovation and so sustain higher returns of v for that period. 
Allowing additional pre-grant imitators would reduce pre-patent returns but does not change the comparative statics. 
11 This is the Nash bargaining outcome assuming that parties have equal bargaining power. Gans and Stern (2000) 
develop non-cooperative foundations for this bargaining assumption in the context of a licensing game where the 
timing of agreement is endogenous (although that model implicitly assumes that a patent has already been granted). 
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an agreement at time 0 will jointly yield (1 ) [ ]T Tv E vδ δ− + , a gain of (1 )T vδ− . It is beneficial for the 
parties to agree earlier regardless of the uncertainty over scope. The ‘price’ agreed to at that time will 
reflect the differing impacts of patent scope uncertainty on R and C. Since firms split the surplus evenly: 
 ( )1 1 10 0 02 2 2
's surplus from an earlier 's surplus from an earlier
rather than later agreement rather than later agreement
(1 ) [ ] ( (1 ) ) 1 (1 )T T T T T
R C
t p v v E v t p v p v t p vδ δ δ δ δ− = − + − − + − ⇒ = − −14243 1444444442444444443  (1) 
In this case, C’s expected return is 12 (1 (1 )) (1 )
T Tp v p vδ δ− − + − . It is useful to observe that R’s return 
through licensing is increasing in p, since this enhances the expected value of the innovation. In a 
frictionless environment, license timing is driven solely by productive efficiency. To be sure, uncertainty 
over IP rights impacts the distribution of returns between the parties: as the likelihood of stronger patent 
protection increases, R earns relatively more than C. However, in the absence of frictions in the market for 
ideas, the patent grant allowance does not impact the timing of technology licensing.  
The case of frictions. While delay and uncertainty has no impact on the timing of technological 
trade in the baseline model, barriers to exchange in the market for ideas can induce a dependency between 
the patent allowance date and the timing of cooperative agreements. We focus on frictions which not only 
reduce the ability to achieve efficient trade but for which the reduction of uncertainty over patent scope 
serves to spur technological trade, including asymmetric information, search costs, and the ability of 
potential licensors to expropriate knowledge which is disclosed but unprotected by IP rights. 
Consider the role of information asymmetries. The licensor may possess a number of different 
types of advantaged information, from information about the overall value of the license (and in which 
contingencies the innovation might be valuable) or the timing and/or scope of the rights to be allowed. 
Asymmetric information (from whatever source) leads to the potential failure to achieve a productively 
efficient agreement. Even when productively efficient technology exchanges would be jointly efficient, if 
potential licensors cannot credibly signal the value of their innovation (relative to the distribution of 
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quality types), the market for ideas can break down.12 If the source of asymmetric information is unrelated 
to the information resolved by patent grant, the mere allowance of a patent will not alleviate this 
breakdown in technological trade. However, if the asymmetric information between the licensor and 
potential licensees relates, in part, to the probability that a patent will receive narrow (rather than broad) 
scope (i.e., differences in the value of p), or the precise nature of the claims that are likely to be allowed, 
then the clarification of those rights may spur market exchange. By waiting until IP rights are clarified, 
those who are likely to receive broad protection (relative to the expectations of potential licensees) are 
able to earn a licensing premium. When the patent allowance reduces the degree of asymmetric 
information (or, equivalently, allows for more efficient sorting of technologies), at least some potential 
licensors will delay cooperative commercialization until the uncertainty of patent scope is resolved. 
A second mechanism resulting in a dependency between patent grant and the timing of 
cooperation arises from the presence of search costs. If the innovator has to engage in costly search to 
locate the most suitable commercialization partner, the incentives to search may only be sufficient after a 
patent (with broad scope) has already been allowed (Hellmann, 2005). Suppose that the cost of finding a 
partner is a fixed cost, f, in which R can locate a customer, C, who would value the innovation Δ greater 
than the baseline of v or v, and that once f is sunk, an agreement with this high-valuation partner is 
immediately feasible. On the one hand, locating a partner at time 0 increases R’s returns 
by ( )12 1 (1 )T pδ− − Δ . However, if R waits until the patent is granted at T, the search will only be 
undertaken if the patent scope is broad, and its returns from search would be 12 Δ . If 
( )1 12 21 (1 )T p fδ− − Δ < ≤ Δ , then R will be willing to search at T but unwilling to search at time 0. 
Moreover, the returns from time 0 agreement stay constant, while the returns from a time T agreement 
will be increased to ( )12 ( )T p v fδ + Δ − . Therefore, if ( )112 TTp v fδδ−Δ − ≥ , then R will prefer to delay 
                                                 
12 There is some analysis of this in the literature on patent licensing (e.g., Anton and Yao, 1994) but it focuses on 
achieving agreements in the face of information asymmetry rather than timing per se. A related literature on 
bargaining under asymmetric information provides a motivation for inefficient delay (Ausubel et al., 2002).  
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search. Since the returns to search are higher when patent scope is known to be broad, search costs may 
induce delay until uncertainty over patent scope is resolved. 
A third mechanism – and perhaps the most important – arises from the ability of licensees to 
expropriate knowledge that is disclosed by the licensor but unprotected by intellectual property. The 
potential for expropriation can significantly limit information disclosure by licensors (Arrow, 1962; 
Anton and Yao, 1994), particularly when knowledge disclosure requires effort on the part of the licensor 
(Arora, 1995). As emphasized in the baseline model, the mere presence of unprotected knowledge has no 
impact on the timing of cooperative licensing (though it will have a significant impact on the division of 
rents). However, establishing patent rights scope can have a significant impact on the risk of 
expropriation and the willingness of licensors to disclose unprotected information. While it may be 
difficult to predict the impact of unpatentable knowledge disclosure during the pre-grant period, start-up 
innovators may be able to tailor their disclosures to avoid expropriation in the event of bargaining 
breakdown once the scope of rights is clarified. For example, prior to patent grant, non-disclosure 
agreements with potential partners may be difficult (if not impossible) to write with any degree of 
precision or potential for enforcement; after a patent is granted, the costs and complexity of such contracts 
may decrease significantly. To the extent that the clarification of formal property rights reduces the risk of 
knowledge leakage, patent allowances may spur participation in the market for ideas.  
The role of the strategic disclosure of unprotected complementary knowledge will be particularly 
important when such disclosures require effort on the part of the licensor (Arora, 1995).13 Suppose we 
reinterpret Δ in the search model above as the additional value that comes through knowledge transfer and 
f as R’s effort in facilitating that transfer. It may be difficult to contract on the supply of effort. Even if the 
outcome and costs of such transfer (Δ, f) are observable to both parties, it may be unverifiable to a third 
party (such as a judge) and so any agreement may not be enforceable. In this case, whether knowledge is 
                                                 
13 As Arora (1995) emphasizes, “[t]echnology licensing involves more than just the permission to use the knowledge 
covered by patents: In many cases, the information required for successful utilization extends even beyond 
blueprints, drawings, and specifications and includes heuristics, rules of thumb, and other ‘tricks of the trade.’” 
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transferred will depend upon R’s incentives to do so.14 As in the search model, the primary issue is 
whether the reduction in uncertainty afforded by the patent allowance increases the gains from trade from 
cooperative commercialization evaluated at that point as compared to a prior time period. Using a similar 
analysis to the search model, if 1 12 2(1 (1 ))
T fpδ Δ < ≤ Δ− − , then R will be willing to transfer knowledge 
at T but will be unwilling to do so at time 0. Thus, by waiting, the gains from trade rise by ( )Tp fδ Δ − . 
However, the opportunity cost of that delay is (1 )T vδ− . So if 1 TTp v fδδ−Δ − > , delay will occur.15 
Intuitively, while the incentives to disclose tacit knowledge after a licensing agreement has been 
signed are limited (the licensee will simply expropriate the value of any such disclosures), there may be 
significant incentives to disclose complementary tacit knowledge prior to the realization of a cooperative 
agreement. If disclosing such knowledge raises the value of the patentable portion of the innovation to 
potential licensors (while maintaining the relative bargaining position of licensee and licensor), then the 
willingness-to-pay by C will be increasing in the effort devoted to disclosure by R. Moreover, since the 
additional value created by knowledge disclosure depends on the value of the patentable knowledge, the 
total incentives and equilibrium level of disclosure will depend on whether patent scope is known to be 
broad or whether patent rights remain uncertain. When the value arising from broad patent rights are 
sufficiently high and the “boost” from complementary knowledge disclosure is sufficiently steep, both 
licensors and licensees may delay licensing negotiations until patent allowance in order to maximize the 
innovator’s incentives to transfer tacit knowledge. 
Empirical implications. Market frictions – barriers to efficient technological trade – can induce a 
systematic relationship between the patent grant process and the timing of technology licensing. While 
information asymmetries, search costs, and expropriation risks may limit technological trade prior to the 
receipt of a patent, the reduction of uncertainty resulting from patent grant can trigger trade in the market 
                                                 
14 This framing is consistent with Lowe’s (2004) formulation of licensing when a great deal of knowledge is tacit. 
15 There is a key difference between the search and knowledge transfer models. In the search model, delay is driven 
by R’s own incentives, while in the knowledge transfer model, if trade delay results in losses, C would have the 
ability to compensate R for any loss in its bargaining position that comes from delay. Hence, delay is more likely 
(given the same parameter values) in the knowledge transfer model relative to the search model.  
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for ideas. Conversely, without frictions, there should be no systematic relationship between patent 
allowance and the timing of cooperative agreements. This insight holds several testable implications. 
First, the relative importance of productive efficiency and barriers to technological exchange will 
differ across technologies. As such, the incentives for early licensing and the benefits from delay until 
patent rights are clarified will vary across innovations. Moreover, one might expect that this variation will 
be narrower within a given industry than across industries. For example, most software products are 
associated with relatively short product lifecycles, and so the benefits from productive efficiency are 
likely quite high in this sector. In addition, software patents are thought by some to be susceptible to 
being “low quality” and held invalid if challenged (Hall and MacGarvie (2006) and references therein). 
Conversely, studies of the “patent thicket” in the semiconductor industry (Shapiro, 2001) suggest 
significant barriers to efficient technological trade (and the ability of enforceable IP rights in reducing 
those barriers) in those sectors. So both pre-allowance and post-allowance licensing agreements will be 
observed in equilibrium, and the propensity for pre-grant and post-grant licensing will vary by industry 
and other observable characteristics of the technology and innovator. Second, if barriers to technological 
exchange limit early licensing, clarification of patent rights reduces the frictions in the market for ideas 
and so raise the incentives to achieve a cooperative agreement. As a result of these enhanced incentives, 
the equilibrium impact of patent allowance will be to raise the hazard rate of achieving a licensing 
agreement. Relative to a baseline pattern of the timing of cooperation, patent allowances are predicted to 
be associated with a “boost” in licensing.  
Third, the theoretical framework suggests that after the scope of IP rights is clarified, productive 
efficiency considerations provide incentives for firms to achieve a licensing agreement as soon as 
possible. Thus, for firms seeking a licensing partner as part of the commercialization process, licensing 
will tend to take place immediately after the patent allowance date. A higher hazard of licensing 
immediately following the patent allowance date provides evidence for both the existence of frictions in 
the market for ideas and for the value of formal IP rights in facilitating cooperative technology transfer. 
Finally, patent allowance importance depends upon the strategic environment in which the firm operates. 
The clustering of licensing after the patent allowance date results from the strategic choice by firms to 
wait for the clarification of uncertainty (and is balanced against a desire for productive efficiency). The 
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impact of patent allowance will thus be relatively unimportant in environments where productive 
efficiency is particularly important, such as industrial sectors with short product life cycles (such as the 
software industry). Also, the impact of patent allowance will be muted in environments where the impact 
of frictions is modest. For example, in locations or industries in which alternative institutional 
arrangements may provide a substitute for formal IP rights, the impact of patent allowance on the hazard 
rate of licensing will be reduced. As such, the framework predicts that the impact of patent allowance will 
be lower for firms with access to rich “knowledge broker” networks, such as those located in Silicon 
Valley or those who are affiliated with networked venture capitalists (e.g., Saxenian, 1994). 
4. Data 
Our data are drawn from a sample of more than 200 technology licensing deals announced 
between 1990 and 1999, and appearing in the Security Data Corporation (SDC) database. Our sample 
allows us to focus on the timing of licensing relative to changes in the IPR environment for a sample of 
technologies which seek and receive patent protection and for which a licensing outcome is realized. For 
each deal, we gathered the license date announcement, the deal industry sector, and firm location and age 
information. For each patent-license pair, we then collected detailed patent information from the USPTO 
and the NBER patent data file (Hall et al., 2001), and VC financing information from the Venture 
Economics database. After trimming the dataset to focus on an unambiguous set of patent-license pairs 
between start-up innovators and downstream firms, the final dataset consists of 198 observations across 
four industry sectors (more details of the sampling scheme are contained in Appendix A). 
Variable definitions and summary statistics. Table 1 reports variable definitions and summary 
statistics for each of the timing measures, and patent and firm characteristics. Each of the timing measures 
is calculated relative to the patent application date. Patent application date is the date of first patent 
application for a given technology, inclusive of continuances, divisions, and provisional applications.16 
We investigate two timing measures linked to the reduction in uncertainty resulting from administrative 
actions on the part of the patent office. Patent allowance date is the date on which the USPTO sends a 
                                                 
16 Our results are also robust to use of the “final” application date.  
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Notice of Patent Allowance to the patent applicant, at which point the “prosecution on the merits is 
closed” (see footnote 3). From the perspective of our theoretical framework, the patent allowance date is a 
key event, since the Notice of Patent Allowance provides an unambiguous and finalized statement of 
claims allowed by the patent office (claims which may be revised by the judicial system (Lemley and 
Shapiro, 2005)).17 We define the patent allowance lag as simply the patent allowance date less the patent 
application date, measured in months, and the post-allowance administrative lag as the patent grant date 
less the patent allowance date, also in months. While the mean of patent application date is in the early 
portion of 1991, the average patent grant date occurs at the end of 1993 (the average patent allowance lag 
is more than 32 months). Interestingly, the average post-allowance administrative lag is more than 6 
months, and ranges from 1 to 19 months (with 60% experiencing a 5-7 month administrative lag). 
The central focus of our empirical analysis is the relative timing of technology licensing and 
patent allowance. Our remaining timing measures therefore depend on the licensing date. For each 
technology, the licensing date is the first publicly reported instance of licensing, as reported by the SDC 
database. We define the licensing lag to be equal to the time (in months) between patent application date 
and the licensing date (mean = 44.54). As well, we construct a dummy variable, post patent allowance, 
equal to one for those licenses recorded after the patent allowance date (mean = 0.73), and a separate 
dummy variable, post patent grant, equal to one for those licenses recorded after the patent grant date 
(mean = 0.58). Figure B plots the distribution of the difference between patent allowance lag and 
licensing lag: data to the left of 0 are associated with licensing deals reached prior to patent allowance, 
while data to the right of 0 indicate post-allowance licensing. There seems to be a marked increase in the 
level of licensing for about a year from the patent allowance date. In other words, despite wide variation 
in both the patent allowance and licensing lag, there seems to be a striking linkage between the timing of 
patent allowance and licensing agreements. 
                                                 
17 It is possible that communications prior to the Notice of Patent Allowance reduces uncertainty over claims prior 
to the patent allowance date. We investigate this by checking for an uptick in licensing prior to the patent allowance 
date. We also investigate whether the patent grant date has an additional impact beyond the patent allowance date. 
In an earlier draft, we focused exclusively on the patent grant date, where we observed a significant rise in licensing 
activity in the four months prior to the patent grant date. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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As described in Table 1 and in more detail in Appendix A, our dataset also includes firm and 
patent characteristics. These measures allow us to evaluate the impact of observable measures of the 
business environment on licensing behavior. In terms of firm characteristics, we define dummies for 
locations that may provide access to different types of technology licensing networks (Silicon Valley, 
Route 128, and Canada), and proxies for firm experience and resources, including firm age and VC 
funded. We additionally construct four industry dummy variables: biotechnology, electronics, software, 
and scientific instruments sectors. Not only might the underlying timing of licensing differ significantly 
across industry sectors (and so we stratify the baseline hazard rate by industry), but the importance of 
patent allowance may also vary across industries. For example, patent allowance may be relatively 
unimportant in the software industry (where product cycle time is short and patents are either weak or 
copyright protection may serve as a substitute (Graham and Mowery, 2003; Lerner and Zhu, 
forthcoming), but more salient in biotechnology (where the product lifecycle is less rapid and where 
achieving effective tacit knowledge transfer may be particularly important). Finally, we include several 
patent characteristics in the analysis. From the NBER patent data file (Hall et al, 2001), we include patent 
claims, patent classes, patent citations made, patent backward citation lag, and patent originality. We 
also include the number of non-patent references to the scientific literature, science references, and the 
number of non-patent, non-scientific references, non-science references. These patent characteristics may 
be informative about the incentives for pre- versus post-allowance licensing, such as the importance of 
productive efficiency, the level of tacit knowledge, or patent scope, and so may influence the baseline 
hazard rate of licensing, or mediate the salience of patent allowance itself. As we discuss in some detail in 
Appendix A, the interpretation of each of these individual measures is subtle, and so we are therefore 
cautious in our interpretation of these measures. 
Table 1B provides a tabulation of the patent allowance lag and licensing lag by industry. While 
electronics and scientific instruments are associated with a relatively short patent allowance lag (27 
months), average allowance lags are much longer in biotechnology (38 months). While the licensing lag is 
also longest in biotechnology, software is associated with the shortest licensing lag (40 months). Whereas 
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patent delay is shortest in the electronics industry, this industry is associated with the second longest 
licensing lag. This variation in both patent allowance lag and licensing lag leads to significant cross-
industry variation in the share of licenses realized after patent allowance: while post allowance licensing 
occurs more than 80% of the time in electronics, less than two-third of software industry licenses occur 
prior to the patent allowance date. Patents seem to play different roles in different sectors; evaluating this 
claim systematically requires an analysis of how patent allowance date shifts the licensing hazard rate. 
5. The Empirical Framework 
Our objective is to identify the causal impact of patent allowance date (or patent grant date) on 
the timing of licensing behavior. The heart of the empirical strategy is to exploit the significant empirical 
variation in patent allowance and licensing lags across technologies, and the timing of licensing relative to 
patent allowance. For each technology, we structure the dataset into monthly observations from the patent 
application date, and define Licenseit equal to 0 for the period prior to the end of the licensing lag, and 
equal to 1 for the month in which the licensing lag ends (resulting in a unique absorbing event from the 
first license). We also define a time-varying regressor, Post-Patentit, equal to 0 for months after the patent 
application date but prior to the patent allowance date, and equal to 1 after the patent allowance date. 
Since we observe a pre-patent and post-patent period for each innovation (and it is possible that licensing 
occurs prior to the post-patent period), our empirical objective is analogous to the estimation of the 
“treatment effect” of patent allowance date on the timing of licensing (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003). 
Here, we discuss our empirical specification for identifying this parameter, our approach to testing the 
key hypotheses, and the impact of our sample selection criteria on the interpretation of the estimates. 
Our analysis employs a Cox proportional hazard rate model with time-varying regressors. The 
Cox model is specified as a continuous time hazard rate function, which incorporates a non-parametric 
baseline hazard rate and a multiplicative term allowing regressors to have a proportional impact relative 
to the baseline (Lancaster, 1990). Letting hlicense equal the hazard rate of license changing from 0 to 1 (i.e., 
the instantaneous probability of failure at t, conditional on survival until t), allowing for stratification by 
industry, and including controls for observable factors shifting the Cox hazard rate function: 
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where l subscripts each industrial sector, and Z includes firm, location, and patent characteristics. Under 
the assumption that (2) is the true model, βPOST PATENT can be interpreted as the impact of patent allowance 
date on the licensing hazard rate. The identification of this parameter relies on variation in the patent 
allowance lag (if all technologies experienced the same patent allowance lag, we could not disentangle 
the impact of patent allowance date from the baseline hazard). However, unobserved heterogeneity 
makes identifying βPOSTPATENT challenging ( ( , POST PATENT , ),tLICENSE iih t l Z  
0 POST PATENT( ) exp{ }POST PATENT
l t
Z i i ih t Zβ β β ν= ⋅ + + + ), where νi is drawn from a distribution, f(ν), but is 
unobservable to the econometrician (van den Berg, 2001)). The presence of unobserved heterogeneity can 
result in bias if νi is correlated with the observables, in particular POST PATENT. For example, 
technologies with long patent allowance lags may tend to have low realizations of νi, and so rather than a 
causal impact of patent allowance date on the licensing hazard, there may simply be a spurious 
correlation between the length of the patent allowance lag and the length of the licensing lag. However, as 
emphasized by Abbring and van den Berg (2003), the presence of unobserved heterogeneity does not 
necessarily undermine the identification of the impact of a “treatment effect” (in this case, βPOST PATENT). 
Whereas the value of νi impacts the hazard rate in all periods, POST PATENT only impacts the hazard 
rate after the patent allowance date. To exploit this insight, we take advantage of a relatively unique 
feature of our dataset: we observe patent allowance lag for all technologies, even those who “fail” (i.e., 
license) prior to the patent allowance date. We include patent allowance lag as a regressor in the hazard 
function, which controls for correlation between patent allowance lag and licensing lag, and focus on the 
change in the hazard after the patent allowance date:18 
{ }0 PATENTLAG i POST PATENT( ,POST PATENT , ) ( ) exp PATENT LAG POST PATENT, l ttLICENSE i Z i i iih t l h t ZZ β β β β ν= ⋅ + + + +            (3) 
As long as post patent is conditionally independent of νi (conditional on stratification by industry, Z, and 
                                                 
18 Including patent lag as a linear term is arbitrary and experiments with a “control function” approach or a shared 
frailty parameter do not change the qualitative results (see the online Appendix D). 
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patent allowance lag), the Cox regression coefficient on βPOST PATENT can be interpreted as the impact of 
patent allowance date on the hazard of licensing (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003).  
This framework provides a parametric test for our first hypothesis, and can be adapted to evaluate 
our supplementary hypotheses (see Appendix C). First, we can define a set of time-varying measures 
which will allow us to estimate coefficients to evaluate how the hazard rate is changing during time 
intervals as the patent allowance date approaches and during time intervals after patent allowance has 
occurred. According to the theory, there should be no effect or, at most, a modest effect as information is 
being revealed prior to the patent allowance date, followed by an enhanced licensing hazard rate, 
attenuating over time. Second, we can introduce several interaction terms between post patent allowance 
and measures of the strategic and technological environment. We de-mean each element of our control 
vector Zi (i.e., calculate Z ) to formulate a specification which allows us to estimate how the overall 
impact of patent allowance date on licensing changes with changes in the underlying economic, strategic, 
and technical environment. Third, we can distinguish whether the licensing hazard rate results from the 
patent allowance date or from the subsequent formal patent grant date. 
6. Empirical Results 
We are now ready to examine the hazard rate results. Table 2 presents our baseline Cox hazard 
regression results based on monthly data. In this and the following empirical tables, we present both the 
estimated coefficients as well as the implied hazard ratios (which should be read relative to one), since the 
latter makes the estimated size effects more apparent. The “failure” event in these regressions is the first 
instance of patent licensing. The first specification, (2-1), examines the impact of a post-allowance patent 
(without additional controls) on the hazard of licensing. The estimate is significant at the 1% level (all 
estimates are based on robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level), and implies that patent 
allowance is associated with more than a 200% increase in the underlying hazard rate.19 The second 
column of Table 2 adds the regressor patent allowance lag, which controls for the underlying correlation 
                                                 
19 All findings are robust to either the patent allowance date or patent grant date as the key timing measure. 
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between the pendency from patent application to allowance and licensing speed. This specification also 
allows each industry to have its own baseline hazard function (as an industry-stratified hazard model) and 
includes fixed effects for each patent application year. By allowing the industry hazard rate and the 
impact of patent application year to be freely estimated, our post patent allowance estimate is identified 
from within-industry variation of patent “cohorts.” By controlling directly for the spurious correlation 
between patent allowance lags and licensing lags (due to potential unobserved features of the technology), 
and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity through stratification and application year fixed effects, we 
expect the absolute size of the post patent allowance coefficient to decline. Indeed, the size of the 
coefficient is reduced relative to (2-1); however, the estimated coefficient remains large and statistically 
significant (the notice of allowance increases the hazard rate by just under 70%). As well, the coefficient 
on patent allowance lag is negative and highly significant, suggesting that longer patent allowance times 
are correlated with longer licensing lags. Together, these results suggest that while unobserved factors 
shaping the timing of licensing and patent allowance lags are important, patent allowance itself has an 
independent causal impact on the market for ideas.20 In the final specification in Table 2, we add one 
additional regressor, post patent grant. This allows us to examine whether the additional event of actually 
receiving the patent grant changes the hazard of licensing, above and beyond the patent allowance event. 
It does not. The post patent allowance coefficient remains large and significant. Hence, the probability of 
licensing is significantly enhanced when uncertainty surrounding formal IP rights is reduced. 
Table 3 examines whether this core finding is robust to the inclusion of different controls. Each 
specification continues to include a complete set of patent application year fixed effects, industry-level 
stratification, and a control for patent allowance lag. We begin with firm characteristics. In (3-1), we 
include the three location variables (allowing us to explore whether licensing effects are different in 
technologically “networked” locales such as Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Saxenian, 1994)). (3-2) 
includes both firm age and VC funded (thereby controlling for firm maturity, access to financial resources, 
                                                 
20 Online Appendix D includes additional specifications exploring this baseline result, including the use of a control 
function approach, a shared frailty parameter, and a parametric distribution for the baseline hazard rate. The 
estimated coefficient on post patent allowance is larger in these specifications and remains statistically significant.  
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and the potential for access to the VC network). While none of these control variables is individually 
significant (or even estimated to have a large impact), the underlying size and significance of the post 
patent allowance coefficient persists. We then include the complete set of measured patent characteristics 
in (3-3) and, finally, include all control variables in (3-4). In both of these specifications (as well as the 
additional robustness checks we discuss below), the coefficient on post patent allowance is remarkably 
stable, both in economic and statistical significance. In addition, two of the patent characteristic variables 
are significantly related to changes in the licensing hazard rate. A one standard deviation increase in 
patent backward citation lag is associated with more than a 25% reduction in the licensing hazard rate. 
This finding is consistent with the interpretations of Narin (1994) and Markewicz (2005), who suggest 
that higher backward citation lags may be associated with longer technology cycle times. Productive 
efficiency considerations may not be as important in such settings, resulting in a lower hazard. The 
coefficient on science references is also significant and positive (though the estimated magnitude is 
relatively small), and is consistent with Fleming and Sorenson’s (2004) suggestion that science-intensive 
patents have a higher degree of technological transparency (and would thus involve a less complex 
licensing process). These patterns hold across a wide range of control structures and robustness checks.21 
We now turn to our second hypothesis, and examine whether licensing behavior is “clustered” in 
the period immediately following patent allowance. To do so, we estimate an industry-stratified model 
with application-year specific fixed effects (similar to (2-3)). In place of the post patent allowance 
dummy variable, we estimate eight mutually exclusive time window dummies.22 Our results are presented 
in Figure C. In the eight months prior to the patent allowance date (which are estimated using two four 
                                                 
21 We experimented with measures of technology “importance,” including the forward citations to each patent. 
Since this measure may be endogenous (early licensing may induce higher number of forward citations), we do not 
include it in Table 3 (the results are similar and forward citations is insignificant). The results are also robust to 
various sub-samples: young firms (below the median sample age), “early” cohorts (applications before 1996), “late” 
cohorts (applications after 1990), using a time window to account for a “pre-announcement” effect (allowing the 
treatment three months prior to the actual allowance date), and excluding six patents that have undergone litigation.   
22 The windows are as follows: greater than 12 months prior to patent allowance (normalized to 1.0), 12 to 8 months 
prior to allowance, 7 to 4 months prior to allowance, 3 months to allowance, 1 to 4 months after allowance, 5 to 8 
months after allowance, 9 to 12 months after allowance, and greater than 12 months after allowance. Because these 
time window dummies are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, we cannot separately estimate the impact of post 
patent allowance. We instead focus on the changes during the periods up to and after the allowance date. 
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month time window dummies), there is a slight (statistically insignificant) increase in the licensing hazard 
rate. In contrast, during the two four month windows just after patent allowance, there is a dramatic spike 
in the licensing hazard (the hazard rate jumps more than 100% during these two periods). Thereafter, the 
hazard rate once again declines, stabilizing at a level of approximately 1.25 (relative to the baseline 
hazard). These effects are not simply a qualitative pattern. It is possible to reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient in the four months just after the patent allowance date is equal to earlier window 
coefficients. These results offer a significant refinement on our earlier analysis: not only does patent 
allowance have a permanent impact on the licensing hazard, but the effect also seems to be most salient in 
the period just after the patent allowance itself. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) suggest that a key piece 
of evidence for the “causal” impact of a treatment is whether the hazard rate increases significantly in the 
period immediately after the treatment (but not before). Figure C accords precisely with the intuition, 
suggesting a causal influence of patent allowance on the hazard rate of licensing. 
Finally, we examine interaction effects between post patent allowance and patent and firm 
characteristics. While the interaction effects with industry dummies are modeled directly (i.e., 
t
i iPost Patent Allowance Industry⋅ ), the remainder of the interaction effects are defined as an interaction 
between post patent allowance and deviations from the sample means for each measure (i.e., 
( )ti iPost Patent Allowance Z Z⋅ − ). As such, the coefficient on post patent allowance (or post patent 
allowance * industry) can be interpreted as the effect when each of the interaction measures are set equal 
to their sample means. The first column of Table 4 examines the complete set of post patent 
allowance*industry interaction effects together with the regressor patent allowance lag. While the effect 
of post patent allowance is positive in all industries, patent allowance has a significant impact in the 
electronics and biotechnology industries, no statistically significant impact on licensing behavior in 
scientific instruments and only a negligible and noisy positive coefficient in the software industry. This 
pattern is consistent with key differences between these industries. In biotechnology, patent protection is 
extremely important and long regulatory lags may make productive efficiency concerns less important. 
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Conversely, in the software industry, technology cycle times are very rapid, copyright protection offers a 
substitute mechanism for protecting IP in the context of licensing negotiations, and software patents 
themselves may be of uneven quality (e.g., Hall and MacGarvie, 2006).  
The second column investigates interaction effects between patent allowance and firm location, 
age, and funding. The only significant interactions are with the Silicon Valley and Route 128 location 
dummies. While the direct effect of being located in Silicon Valley is an increase in the licensing hazard 
rate, patent allowance itself plays a much more muted role for Silicon Valley companies (and companies 
in the Route 128 area). Though there may be several explanations for this finding (e.g., the types of 
technologies developed in these locations may be different), these results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the impact of formal intellectual property may be reduced in highly networked 
environments where licensees may be protecting their reputation in the market for ideas and brokers 
actively seek to facilitate the licensing process. In (4-3), we examine interactions between patent 
characteristics and post patent allowance. We find one effect in addition to the significant effects of 
patent backward citation lag and science references (as in Table 3). While the direct effect of patent 
classes is positive, the interaction between patent classes and post patent allowance is negative. Though 
we are cautious in our interpretation (several of the patent characteristic measures are correlated with each 
other), the direct patent classes effect is consistent with the hypothesis that technologies associated with a 
greater number of patent classes may be of interest to a wider range of potential licensees, but that the 
enforceability of patents with coverage across a wider number of classes is more uncertain. The 
coefficient on patent allowance lag * post patent allowance is small and insignificant, and so the impact 
of patent allowance does not seem to depend on the length of the patent allowance lag. The final 
specification includes all patent and firm characteristics, and a complete set of interaction effects. While 
several of the coefficients are noisier, the overall pattern of results remains: the impact of patent 
allowance is highest for the electronic equipment industry, and is lower for firms located in Silicon Valley 
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and technologies that cover a wider range of patent classes.23 
7. Conclusions 
This paper considers the impact of delays in the granting of IP on the market for ideas. To the 
extent that patent allowance mitigates uncertainty regarding the scope of IP protection, delays in resolving 
that uncertainty may delay cooperative commercialization agreements. Among our sample of start-up 
innovators who ultimately reach a licensing agreement, the impact of patent allowance is associated with 
a 70% increase in the hazard rate of licensing, and this effect is most pronounced in the time period 
immediately following the patent allowance event. The results are also conditioned on the strategic and 
institutional environment in which firms operate. For technologies where productive efficiency effects are 
important, licensing is rapid. For technologies with alternative IP rights available (such as copyright), or 
firms in locations where information brokers and reputational mechanisms may be important (such as 
Silicon Valley), the impact of patent allowance on the licensing hazard rate is reduced.24 
Our findings provide evidence for frictions in the market for ideas. Such frictions might arise 
from asymmetric information, search costs, or the challenges associated with transferring tacit knowledge 
from start-up innovators to potential licensees. While prior research suggested the role of formal IP in 
enabling the markets for ideas, the evidence presented here offers the first direct evidence that private-
sector innovators are causally influenced by the receipt of IP rights. Patent allowance reduces the 
uncertainty of patent scope, and so reduces (though does not eliminate) imperfections in the market for 
                                                 
23 We also examined whether the impact of patent allowance is changing over time by interacting post patent 
allowance with application year. The coefficient is small and not significant. We also explored whether the impact 
of patent allowance is changing over time differentially across industries. We did not identify any significant trends. 
Finally, we tested whether there was a change in the impact of patent allowance after the 1995 patent harmonization 
reforms (which dated patent terms from application rather than grant). We only observe 29 licenses with patent 
application dates after 1995, and so the results are noisy (the sign and magnitude vary depending on specification). 
24 Estimates from a parametric failure time model in the online Appendix (D-4) imply that for firms using the patent 
system to achieve a licensing agreement, patent allowance delay results in an 18-month average delay in licensing. 
Our analysis is conditioned on a sample of innovations receiving patents which are ultimately licensed, and so likely 
yields an upper bound on the population impact of the patent system on the market for ideas. Because some 
innovators never seek licenses for their technology, the population impact of patent allowance is equal to βPOST 
PATENT multiplied by the share of innovators seeking licensing. Hsu (2006), using a broadly similar approach for 
identifying start-up innovators and examining a dataset of over 1,100 technology entrepreneurs, finds that 42% of 
start-up innovators receive at least one patent, and 15% of those firms commercialize through cooperation. 
Therefore, while the marginal impact of patent allowance is significant the overall start-up licensing rate is modest. 
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ideas. The analysis highlights the value of grappling with the operational details of the patent system. It 
would also be interesting to identify the types of technologies or companies that are able to achieve 
cooperative commercialization outcomes in the absence of patent allowance. Our analysis also highlights 
the strategic tradeoff innovators face between the protection of their ideas and the pursuit of an effective 
commercialization strategy. While commercialization would often be enhanced by prompt and pervasive 
disclosure (perhaps including scientific journal publication, participation in standards-setting bodies, etc.), 
establishing protection against expropriation often requires delay and some level of secrecy. Since the 
market for ideas is imperfect, the disclosure strategy of the firm becomes crucial. A recent literature has 
begun to explore these issues, ranging from choices over when to publish or not in the scientific and 
technical literature, when to patent or not, and when to protect knowledge through tacit means or outright 
secrecy (e.g., Arora et al., 2001; Gittleman and Kogut, 2003). While this work begins to unpack some of 
the tradeoffs arising from disclosure and the use of an (imperfect) intellectual property and litigation 
system, we leave the formulation of an optimal disclosure strategy across the full range of strategic and 
institutional environments as an open question. 
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Figure A: Uncertainty and the Patenting Process 
 
Figure B: Distribution of Difference between Patent Allowance and Licensing Dates 
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Figure C: Licensing Hazard Ratio, Pre- vs. Post-Patent Allowance 
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Table 1A 
Variable Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations 
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN SD 
Timing Measures 
Patent application date Date of patent application 1991.16 3.96 
Patent allowance date Date of USPTO notice of patent allowance 1993.88 3.94 
Patent grant date Date of USPTO notice of patent grant 1994.40 3.89 
Licensing date Date of patent licensing 1994.95 3.47 
Licensing lag Licensing date – Patent application date (in 
months) 
44.54 26.46 
Post patent allowance Dummy = 1 if Licensing date > Patent allowance 
date 
0.73 0.45 
Post patent grant Dummy = 1 if Licensing date > Patent grant date 0.58 0.50 
Patent allowance lag Months between patent allowance and patent 
application 
32.58 20.18 
Post-allowance 
administrative lag 
Months between patent allowance and patent grant 6.79 2.81 
Patent Characteristics* 
Patent claims # of claims made in the patent 20.84 19.70 
Patent citations made # of patent citations referenced in the patent 11.17 11.48 
Patent classes # of 3-digit classes to which the patent is assigned 1.90 1.07 
Patent backward citation 
lag 
# of years between patent grant and the average 
grant year of backward citations 
7.54 4.32 
Patent originality 1 – Herfindahl of referenced patent classes (based 
on backward patent citations) 
0.43 0.27 
Science references # of non-patent references made in the patent to the 
scientific literature 
7.56 16.75 
Non-science references # of non-patent references made in the patent to the 
non-scientific literature 
2.40 5.44 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm age Age of the firm in years 6.03 6.68 
VC funded Dummy = 1 if firm is funded by venture capital 0.48 0.50 
Silicon Valley Dummy = 1 if firm is located in Silicon Valley 0.21 0.41 
Route 128 Dummy = 1 if firm is located in Boston region 0.12 0.33 
Canada Dummy = 1 if the firm is located in Canada 0.18 0.38 
* These data (with the exception of the last two) are from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001).  
   
 
Table 1B 
Means of Timing Measures by Industry Sector 
 Biotechnology Electronics Software Sci. Instruments 
# observations 82 44 35 37 
Patent allowance 
lag 
38.34 
(21.66) 
27.32 
(18.03) 
31.51 
(12.67) 
27.05 
(22.17) 
Licensing lag 48.61 
(28.51) 
43.86 
(26.33) 
39.91 
(19.59) 
40.70 
(27.16) 
Post patent 
allowance 
0.70 
(0.46) 
0.80 
(0.41) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
0.78 
(0.42) 
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Table 2: Baseline Cox Hazards (Dependent Variable = LICENSE) 
Independent Var. (2-1) (2-2) (2-3) 
 Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. 
Post patent allowance 3.241*** 
(0.626) 
1.176*** 
(0.193) 
1.695**
(0.453) 
0.528** 
(0.267) 
1.815** 
(0.476) 
0.596** 
(0.262) 
Patent allowance lag 
 
  0.978***
(0.005) 
-0.022***
(0.005) 
0.976*** 
(0.006) 
-0.025*** 
(0.006) 
Post patent grant 
 
    0.793 
(0.198) 
-0.231 
(0.250) 
Patent App. Yr. FE   Yes Yes 
Biotechnology   
Electrical equipment   
Software   
 
hazard rate stratified by 
industry 
 
Hazard rate stratified by 
industry 
Log likelihood -834.170 -537.620 -537.698 
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5% or 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered by 
firm; N = 8045 
 
 
Table 3: Baseline Industry-Stratified Cox Hazards with Controls (Dependent Variable = LICENSE) 
Independent Var. (3-1) (3-2) (3-3) (3-4) 
 Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. 
Post patent allowance 1.690** 
(0.451) 
0.524** 
(0.267) 
1.695** 
(0.453) 
0.528** 
(0.267) 
1.757**
(0.492) 
0.564** 
(0.280) 
1.757** 
(0.494) 
0.563** 
(0.281) 
Patent allowance lag 0.978*** 
(0.005) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.978*** 
(0.005) 
-0.022***
(0.005) 
0.973***
(0.005) 
-0.028*** 
(0.006) 
0.973***
(0.006) 
-0.028*** 
(0.006) 
Silicon Valley  1.000 
(0.224) 
-0.000 
(0.224) 
    0.992 
(0.226) 
-0.008 
(0.228) 
Route 128  1.107 
(0.251) 
0.102 
(0.226) 
    1.069 
(0.271) 
0.067 
(0.253) 
Canada  1.056 
(0.215) 
0.055 
(0.204) 
    1.028 
(0.230) 
0.028 
(0.224) 
VC funded 
 
  1.068 
(0.176) 
0.066 
(0.164) 
  1.007 
(0.190) 
0.007 
(0.189) 
Firm age 
 
  1.001 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
  1.000 
(0.011) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
Patent claims 
 
    1.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
1.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Patent classes 
 
    1.019 
(0.107) 
0.019 
(0.105) 
1.021 
(0.109) 
0.021 
(0.106) 
Patent citations made 
 
    1.004 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
1.004 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
Patent backward citation 
lag 
    0.937***
(0.023) 
-0.065*** 
(0.025) 
0.937***
(0.023) 
-0.065*** 
(0.025) 
Patent originality 
 
    1.460 
(0.527) 
0.379 
(0.361) 
1.488 
(0.562) 
0.397 
(0.378) 
Science references 
 
    1.011***
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
1.011** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
Non-science references 
 
    0.996 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.010) 
0.996 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
Patent App. Yr. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -537.979 -537.978 -527.916 -527.890 
** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm; N 
= 8045. 
  33
Table 4: Industry-Stratified Cox Hazards: Industry, Location & Firm Interaction Effects (Dependent Variable = LICENSE) 
Independent Var. (4-1) (4-2) (4-3) (4-4) 
 Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. 
Post patent allowance   1.64* (0.44) 0.50* (0.27) 1.72* (0.52) 0.54* (0.30)   
Patent allowance lag 0.98*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) 0.98*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) 0.97*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) 0.97*** (0.01) -0.02*** (0.01) 
Biotech * post pat. allowance 1.78* (0.61) 0.57* (0.35)     1.54 (0.70) 0.43 (0.45) 
Software * post patent allowance 1.05 (0.50) 0.05 (0.48)     1.29 (0.82) 0.26 (0.63) 
Electr. equip * post pat. allowance 2.47** (1.13) 0.91** (0.46)     4.19*** (2.22) 1.43*** (0.53) 
Sci. Instrum. * post pat. allowance 1.68 (1.05) 0.52 (0.62)     1.28 (0.85) 0.25 (0.67) 
Silicon Valley    1.89* (0.68) 0.64*(0.36)   2.04* (0.81) 0.71* (0.40) 
Route 128    1.82 (0.68) 0.60 (0.37)   1.35 (0.63) 0.30 (0.47) 
Canada    1.48 (0.59) 0.39 (0.40)   1.11 (0.45) 0.11 (0.41) 
VC funded   1.35 (0.42) 0.30 (0.31)   1.04 (0.39) 0.04 (0.37) 
Firm age   1.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)   1.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
SV * post pat. allowance   0.39** (0.18) -0.94** (0.46)   0.41* (0.20) -0.90* (0.48) 
Rt. 128 * post pat. allow.   0.44* (0.22) -0.81* (0.48)   0.75 (0.46) -0.28 (0.61) 
Canada * post pat. allowance   0.66 (0.32) -0.41 (0.48)   0.91 (0.43) -0.09 (0.47) 
VC funded * post pat. allowance   0.76 (0.27) -0.28 (0.36)   0.92 (0.38) -0.08 (0.42) 
Firm age * post patent allowance   0.99 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)   0.97 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 
Patent claims     1.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Patent classes     1.23** (0.12) 0.21** (0.10) 1.31*** (0.13) 0.27*** (0.10) 
Patent citations made     1.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Patent backward citation lag     0.86** (0.06) -0.15** (0.07) 0.85** (0.06) -0.16** (0.07)
Patent originality     0.71 (0.49) -0.34 (0.69) 1.49 (0.56) -0.30 (0.71) 
Science references     1.01* (0.01) 0.01* (0.01) 1.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Non-science references     1.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 1.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) 
Pat claims* post pat. allowance     1.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Pat classes* post pat. allowance     0.69** (0.12) -0.37** (0.17) 0.64*** (0.11) -0.44*** (0.01) 
Pat cit. made* post pat. allowance     1.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 1.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 
Pat  bkwd cit lag* post pat. allow     1.11 (0.08) 0.10 (0.07) 1.12 (0.08) 0.12 (0.07) 
Patent orig. * post pat. allowance     2.88 (2.36) 1.06 (0.82) 1.00 (0.01) 1.18 (0.87) 
Science ref* post pat. allowance     1.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 1.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 
Non-sci ref* post pat. allowance     0.99 (0.02) -0.01 (0.029) 0.99 (0.03) -0.01 (0.03) 
Pat allow lag * post pat. allow     1.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 
Patent App. Yr. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -537.379 -534.559 -522.555 -518.699 
*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm; N = 8045. 
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APPENDIX A: Data Issues 
 
Sample Selection Criteria. We began by selecting all recorded deals in four sectors that are closely 
associated with cooperative commercialization between start-up innovators and more established industry 
players: biotechnology, electronics, software, and scientific instruments. Based on a reading of the deal 
description from the SDC database, we identified the first significant patent associated with the technology 
from searching the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) website. This was done by searching patent 
titles and abstracts for key words taken from the SDC technology licensing activity description. This process 
yielded 219 patent-license pairs. By construction, our dataset excludes licenses for technologies in which no 
patent was ever issued, as well as technologies which are patented but never licensed. Beginning in 
November 2000, patent applications are disclosed 18 months after filing, as opposed to the time of patent 
grant (see Johnson and Popp (2003) for an analysis of the impact of the American Inventors Protection Act 
of 1999 (AIPA)). To impose uniformity regarding disclosure, and limit right-censoring, our sample covers 
the period prior to the AIPA. 
 
While the overall analysis of deal structure across different types of players is extremely informative (e.g., 
Lerner and Merges, 1998), we focus our data sample in order to construct a clear test of our theoretical 
framework. Our sample is composed of licensing deals between start-up innovators and more established 
firms that are focused on specific technologies (rather than more general agreements involving long-term 
alliances or that are primarily focused on cross-licensing arrangements). From our initial database, we 
eliminate deals with the following characteristics: an established firm licensing to another established firm, 
an established firm licensing to a start-up, a non-profit entity as a licensor or licensee, renewal of a prior 
technology transfer agreement, and transactions involving strictly technology cross-licenses between or 
among parties. The deal was excluded if there was ambiguity over the match between the licensed 
technology and the patent associated with that technology or if the licensing date was earlier than the patent 
application date (the latter cause for exclusion may be related to the former). This process resulted in a final 
sample of 198 technologies for which a patent was issued a license was granted.  
 
For a small set of observations (post-1999 patent grants), the HJT patent characteristics data are not available 
through the NBER file. We constructed the HJT measures for these observations, and checked whether our 
results are sensitive to their inclusion or exclusion. All qualitative results remain the same.  
 
It is also useful to note that the industry coverage is distinct from the geography dummies over the dataset. 
Each of the industries is represented in each of the geographic regions (Silicon Valley, Route 128, Canada, 
and other), and the only significant pair-wise correlation between the industry and geography measures is a 
positive correlation between Route 128 and software (ρ = 0.20). 
 
Firm and patent characteristics. Our dataset also includes firm and patent characteristics, allowing us to 
evaluate the impact of observable measures of the business environment on licensing behavior. First, we 
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define dummy variables indicating locations that may provide access to different types of technology 
licensing networks: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Canada. As key high-technology regions, firms located in 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 may experience a higher overall rate of technology licensing, as network-based 
mechanisms may facilitate exchange even in the absence of IPR, and so licensing may be less sensitive to 
patent allowance in these regions. Our sample also includes a relatively high number of Canadian licensing 
deals, and so we construct a Canada dummy (mean = 0.18). We also include proxies for firm resources, 
experiences and capabilities. Firm age (mean = 6.03) is measured as of the patent application date, and a 
venture capital funding dummy, VC funded (mean = 0.48), only equals one for firms receiving venture 
funding prior to the patent application date. Access to a VC network, as well as increased maturity and 
reputation, might enhance the ability of a firm to engage in cooperative commercialization even in the 
absence of formal IPR (Hsu, 2006). Yet, firms with fewer organizational resources may be unable to delay 
licensing until patent allowance, and so may forego bargaining position to achieve an earlier licensing 
agreement. Younger firms may be less savvy in their approach to licensing, or may be willing to sacrifice 
bargaining power in order to quickly establish a cooperative commercialization agreement with an industry 
incumbent. While the overall effect of firm age or VC funded on the timing of commercialization may 
therefore be ambiguous, inclusion of these measures in our empirical analysis allows us to control for the 
possibility that differences in experience or resources may be correlated with both the licensing lag and the 
patent allowance lag.  
 
We also incorporate several patent characteristics in the analysis. Most of these measures are simply the 
standard measures from the Hall et al. (HJT, 2001) NBER data file. Patent claims is simply the number of 
claims allowed by the examiner (mean = 20.84), while patent classes is the number of distinct primary three 
digit patent classes to which the patent is assigned (this measure ranges from 0-9; mean = 1.90). Patent 
citations made is equal to the number of “backward” citations to prior patents (mean = 11.17). Patent 
backward citation lag is the number of years between the patent grant date and the average grant year of 
those cited patents (mean = 7.56), and patent originality (mean = 0.43) measures the diversity of cited 
references (similar to a traditional Herfindahl index in which the measure ranges from zero to one, and is 
increasing in the uniformity of cited patent classes). We also include the number of non-patent references to 
the scientific literature (science references, mean = 7.56) and the number of non-patent, non-scientific 
references (non-science references, mean = 2.40). These patent characteristics may be informative about the 
incentives for pre- versus post-allowance licensing, such as the importance of productive efficiency, the level 
of tacit knowledge, or patent scope, and so may influence the baseline hazard rate of licensing, or mediate the 
salience of patent allowance itself. Of course, the interpretation of each measure is subtle (HJT, 2001; 
Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). Patent citations made may indicate a higher level of technological 
complexity (and therefore a higher level of tacit knowledge disclosure for effective commercialization), or 
alternately, a high level of this variable may be associated with significant uncertainty over the ultimate 
(enforceable) scope of a patent, since patent rights are more uncertain in the presence of a patent thicket 
(Shapiro, 2001). Similarly, while a higher level of patent claims, patent classes, or patent originality 
indicates a higher level of technological complexity and the likely importance of tacit knowledge, these 
measures may also be associated with increased patent scope (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). While 
some authors argue that science references (and perhaps non-science references) indicate a higher degree of 
transparency for an invention (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004), Lowe (2004) suggests that patents including 
science references are more likely to require a high level of tacit knowledge transfer for effective 
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APPENDIX B 
Timing Lag Distributions 
 
Figure 1A. Distribution of Patent Allowance Lag
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Figure 1B. Distribution of Licensing Lag
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While only a very small number of technologies receive a patent allowance within a year of the application 
date, the majority of the technologies in our sample receive a patent allowance in the second, third, and 
fourth year after application. As well, the patent allowance lag has a large right tail, with a small number of 
technologies with patent allowance lags in excess of nine years. It is possible that extreme lags may be 
associated with technologies in which productive efficiency considerations may not be crucial; accordingly, 
we have experimented extensively with imposing a maximum patent allowance lag (e.g., 60 months). None 
of our key qualitative findings are affected.   
 
In contrast to the patent allowance lag distribution, licensing lag is more evenly distributed. Figure 2 in the 
text of the main paper combines these histograms in reporting the distribution of licensing lag less patent 
allowance lag. Finally, it is useful to note that if we plot the histogram of licensing date less patent grant 
date (rather than patent allowance date), there is a pronounced increase in the rate of licensing in the four to 
six months prior to the patent grant date, which peaks in the first few months after the patent grant date. 
This is consistent with the fact that managers respond to the event associated with uncertainty reduction (the 
patent allowance date) rather than the date at which formal rights commence and the patent grant is 
published. 
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APPENDIX C: The Empirical Framework 
 
In our discussion of the empirical framework, we discuss but do not present the precise specifications for the 
tests of our supplementary hypotheses. First, to evaluate whether licensing is “clustered” immediately after 
the patent allowance date, we define a set of “window” variables (pre patent allowance (k,l) and post patent 
allowance (k,l)), equal to 1 from k to l months prior to (or after) the patent allowance date, and 0 otherwise: 
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Second, we introduce several interaction terms between post patent allowance and measures of the strategic 
and technological environment. To do so, we de-mean each element of our control vector Zi (i.e., calculate 
Z ) to formulate the following hazard model: 
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This allows us to estimate the overall impact of patent grant date on licensing and how this changes with 
changes in the underlying economic, strategic, and technical environment.  
 
Finally, it is possible to incorporate multiple time-varying regressors and to distinguish whether the key 
“shock” to the licensing hazard rate results from the patent allowance date or from the subsequent formal 
patent grant date, as follows: 
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APPENDIX D 
Robustness to Functional Forms and Estimation Methods 
Dependent Variable = LICENSE 
(Robust standard errors are clustered by firm) 
N = 8045 
 
Independent Var. (D-1) (D-2) (D-3) (D-4) 
 Cox proportional hazard models Shared gamma frailty Cox 
regression 
Weibull-distributed failure time 
 Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. Haz. Ratio Coef. Coef. 
Post patent allowance 3.026***
(0.667) 
1.107*** 
(0.220) 
1.751** 
(0.474) 
0.560** 
(0.271) 
3.298*** 
(0.666) 
1.216*** 
(0.202) 
0.859*** 
(0.244) 
Inverse of patent allowance 
lag 
15.059 
(31.972) 
2.712 
(2.123) 
1.501 
(4.276) 
0.406 
(2.849) 
   
Square of patent allowance 
lag 
  1.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
   
Patent allowance lag   0.994 
(0.021) 
-0.006 
(0.022) 
  -0.012*** 
(0.004) 
Patent App. Yr. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -544.639 -537.594 -799.962 -157.177 
 
** and *** indicates statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
This table includes a number of additional empirical specifications exploring the robustness of the baseline results in Table 2. In the spirit of a 
control function approach, (D-1) and (D-2) include alternative functional forms for the treatment of the patent allowance lag (including the inverse 
(D-1) and the inclusion of the inverse, level and square of patent allowance lag (D-2)). In (D-3), we allow for “shared frailty” among technologies 
with similar patent allowance lags (we allow for 13 separate groupings based on six-month allowance lag windows and assume a gamma 
distribution), and in (D-4), we experiment with a specific functional form (Weibull) for the baseline hazard rate. In each of these alternative 
specifications, the estimated coefficient on post patent allowance remains large and statistically significant; indeed, the estimated impact of post 
patent allowance is actually higher for each these alternative assumptions and control structures than the coefficients reported in Table 2. 
 
 
